July 09, 2007

"Justice" issues in Sudanese peace processes

Posted by Helena Cobban at 14:07 | TrackBack

Concordis International, which is "a small British organisation working to help individuals and groups in conflict situations to seek out paths towards lasting peace", recently published (in PDF form) a 24-page account of a consultation they recently held on a number of the different conflicts that have roiled the vast country of Sudan in recent years. The publication is titled Promoting Sustainable Peace in Sudan through Post-Conflict Justice and Reconciliation. It addresses post-conflict challenges in South Sudan, East Sudan, and Darfur.

(Before I proceed to give you more details of this latest Concordis paper, I'd like to quickly note this excellent publication titled Peace by Piece: Addressing Sudan's conflicts, that was co-produced last year by Concordis and the London-based organization Conciliation Resources. Its 23 different articles constitute is a true treasure-trove of information and analysis for anyone interested in war and peace issues in Sudan.)

Participants in the consultation whose contributions are summarized in the most recent Concordis paper include Andrew Rigby of Coventry University, Phil Clark of the University of Ulster, Micah Laila (the Assistant Bishop of Juba-- denomination unstated, but in the context probably Anglican?), Adam Azzain of the University of Khartoum, and a few others.

Here are the Executive Summary, and later the Recommendations, of their consultation. Please note I have added numbers to the 'bulleted point' in both texts, to facilitate discussion):

    Executive Summary

    This Concordis Paper is based on the content of a consultation held in the UK in March 2007, the goal of which was to consider Sudanese approaches to peace-building through post-conflict justice and reconciliation. In other states in Africa - South Africa and Rwanda among others - transitional justice mechanisms have played a central role in post-conflict reconstruction. Participants considered the examples of numerous ‘experiments’ of this nature to inform their discussion about the Sudanese context. In turn, the lessons learnt from African and international experiences fed into their reflections and conclusions about the most appropriate approaches to the pursuit of justice and reconciliation in Sudan.

    Some of the consultation’s central conclusions are outlined below:

    1. Though not all of Sudan is yet ‘post-conflict’, it is timely to consider ways of dealing with the past in order to respond to the present and prepare for the future.

    2. Ultimately, national reconciliation can only be achieved when the root causes of Sudan’s conflicts are addressed in an holistic and just manner, particularly in terms of addressing inequalities in the distribution of wealth and power.

    3. Given the complexity of Sudan’s conflicts, a package of complementary and co-ordinated transitional justice measures at different levels of society is needed.

    4. At a national level, processes of justice and reconciliation should be developed through an inclusive national consensus, so that they enjoy ownership and trust across the diverse groups making up Sudanese society.

    5. Sudan’s religious and cultural traditions emphasise forgiveness. Community conflict resolution practices administered by traditional authorities and religious leaders have many strengths and should be encouraged by the government.

    6. Truth-telling about the past and creating a national record are important to reduce temptations for revenge and promote the rule of law.

    7. Unconditional amnesty could encourage a culture of impunity and is unlikely to be acceptable under current international human rights conventions.

    8. Accountability - meaning both retributive, restorative and redistributive justice - is fundamental to the achievement of broad-based reconciliation and peace.

    9. Transitional justice processes should recognise the disproportionate burden of suffering borne by women in past and current conflicts.

In my judgment, most of these-- especially the first and last!-- are excellent points. However, the one that leaps off the page for me as being very far from helpful is the assertion in #8 that retributive justice is " fundamental to the achievement of broad-based reconciliation and peace." Points 6 and 7 are value judgments. I don't have enough familiarity with Sudan's social norms and realities to be able to make an informed comment on them. But I can certainly say those judgments should remain open to some questioning.

In general, the authors of this summary seem to want to "have it all"-- in terms of sustainable peace and retributive justice and full truth-telling , and give little recognition of the fact that in every single real-life situation of "transitional" justice, trade-offs need to be made among these goals... And they therefore give little indication of the criteria according to which such tough choices should be made.

My own views on these matters have been articulated in my recent book on the topic-- and also in these two earlier posts on TJ Forum: on 'justice and accountability', and on the value of truth-telling.

So here are the Recommendations voiced in this Concordis paper:

    Participants recommended that:

    1. An inclusive institutional mechanism be established to agree an historical record of all acts of political violence since 1 January 1956. This ‘national framework for truth, justice and reconciliation’ would give Sudan’s many different communities the opportunity to air and manage their grievances, agree a shared history and pave the way for a full process of justice and reconciliation.

    2. Ongoing rule of law reform (including for example greater emphasis on training and community policing) be part of an inclusive and effective process of transitional justice.

    3. There should be a mechanism for amnesty for all individuals who have committed crimes in the context of war or with political objectives with the exception of those directly responsible for gross violations of human rights. Amnesty should only be considered once information relating to the crime in question has been fully disclosed.

    4. The importance of individual compensation and collective reparation be recognised, and reparation be linked to a deliberate attempt on the part of the Sudanese government to address socio-economic exclusion through a fair and equitable distribution of resources and rapid development of neglected areas of the country.

    5. Reconciliation processes take into account the disproportionate suffering of women and children.

    6. At local levels, traditional community healing and dispute resolution systems should be recognised and empowered by government to deal effectively and impartially with current inter and intra-group conflicts and disputes across the country.

    7. The role of women and of religious and traditional leaders in local-level peace-building should also be proactively supported by local, regional and national governments.

    8. The provisions of Sudan’s peace agreements for regional and national processes of reconciliation be honoured, fully supported, and, within regional constraints, implemented as a matter of urgency.

Regarding these recommendations, I have my doubts about the value of the first one-- and in particular, the temporal priority they seem to assign to it... What they seem to be saying is that this "National Framework for T, J, and R" should be constituted and do its "truth-establishing" work before there is "a fill process of justice and reconciliation." It is my general observation of truth-seeking exercises, however, that they very frequently run the risk of becoming extremely tendentious and polarizing. And therefore, if they are undertaken at all, it would be very unwise to undertake them before at least the broad underpinnings of a sustainable peace have been put firmly in place.

Similarly, the very tight restrictions that Rec. 3 places on the providing of amnesty seems fairly misplaced to me. The way I read Rec. 3 is that "those directly responsible for gross violations of human rights" (they do not say in whose estimation this is the case, note) should not have any eligibility for amnesties. And those who committed lesser crimes "in the context of war" would win the amnesties only after "full disclosure" (again, they do not say in whose estimation this has happened) of the crime in question.

The temporal priority this plan gives to the proposed TJ&R process, and its specific exclusion of perpetrators of "grave" HR violations from any consideration for amnesty, make it very different from-- and in my view, far less workable or constructive than-- the South African TRC process.

The rest of the Recommendations here seem generally helpful.


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