Transitional Justice Forum

Haiti election has TJ implications

The election last week in Haiti has some startling transitional justice implications. In no way are the events there any different from the status quo; since 1804, at the time of Independence, Haitians have been fighting with enemies, both real and perceived, from inside and outside the country. From that time, Haiti’s politics and economy have been manipulated by a long list of countries, most notably the United States, but more lately including the United Nations and OAS.

As readers will likely know, the recent history of Haiti is tumultuous, at best. After the Duvaliers were deposed in the late 1980s, Jean-Bertrand Aristide rose to power, and was elected in a stunning victory as President in 1990, with 67% of the popular vote. He was overthrown in a military coup just six months afterward. From 1991 to 1994, a campaign of torture was waged against Aristide’s supporters by the regime of General Raoul Cédras, which had staged the coup to force Aristide into exile. More than 50,000 attempted to escape by boat to the United States. As many as 300,000 went into hiding within the country itself. The violence was considerably worse in certain regions of the country, where wholesale slaughter ensued. In other cases, Aristide’s key supporters were brutally murdered. A series of provisional governments, all backed by the armed forces under Cédras, ruled the country. On 15 October, 1994, Aristide was returned to power in Port-au-Prince–with the support of more than 20,000 U.S. troops and uneven support from the international community. Aristide finished serving his one term in office, and then stepped aside to cede power to René Préval, as per the terms of the constitution. But Aristide was re-elected in 2000 with 92% of the electoral vote, and returned to office in February, 2001.

One TJ connection is that Aristide established a truth commission, the Commission nationale de vérité et de justice, to identify instigators, criminals and accessories to the serious human rights violations and the crimes against humanity which had been carried out during the coup d'état, from 29 September 1991 to 15 October 1994, both inside and outside of the country. The Haitian commission was to be carried out by the Organization of American States (OAS) and the United Nations Permanent Mission to Haiti (International Civilian Mission in Haiti or MICIVIH). Accordingly, four of the appointed commissioners were Haitian nationals, all of whom had then been living in exile, and three others were representatives of the international community. Initially, the Commission was to complete its work by September 1995, but this period was eventually extended by three months. The Commission presented its final report in December 1995. In the end, the Commission was forced to deliver a report that many considered unfinished, simply because Aristide was being forced to hand power over to his elected successor, and the mandate had stipulated that the report must be presented directly to Aristide. Much of what the report contained was never really disseminated. And its impact is negligible.

At any rate, it seems to me that the involvement of the outside world in the affairs of Haiti – a sovereign country in its own right – has contributed mightily to the instability that continues to exist. Indeed, this is an issue that scholars and practitioners of transitional justice often overlook, but one which needs to be addressed; that is, to what extent should the desires of the international community be allowed to override the democratic hope that bubbles at the grassroots level? In the Haitian case, the U.S. was more than indirectly involved in the coup that overthrew Aristide in the first place; then-American President George H. Bush sided with the Haitian bourgeoisie and military – a powerful group that wanted Aristide to remain out of power, in part because he wanted to “repatriate” Haitian refugees who had begun to turn up in the U.S. back to Haiti. The Bush administration repeatedly refused to sanction the country in any real way, preferring instead to force Aristide into a complicated power-sharing agreement. The change in America’s Haiti policy was the result of the then-recent presidential elections in Washington, in which Bill Clinton was elected. President Clinton’s position differed greatly from that of former President Bush, because he had actively campaigned for the repatriation of Haitian refugees. But after he was elected, he changed his position and stated that he would return Aristide to power to resolve the refugee issue. However, he placed strict constraints on Aristide’s return to power, and warned that Aristide would be forced to make concessions to the bourgeoisie and military. On 3 July, 1993, the U.S. brokered the Governor’s Island Accord, signed by Aristide and Cédras, which assured the U.S. of a military “counter-balance” against Aristide’s left-leaning agenda. The U.S. further undermined Aristide’s position by negotiating handsome settlements with the former regime in return for their cooperation.

Obviously, Aristide has remained in exile for more than a year. And one could point out that the elections, orchestrated and carried out as they were by the international community, at least had the appearance of being free and fair. Yet, if history is any kind of judge, the people of Haiti are to be forgiven for being sceptical about the slowness to release results, and whether the results will be valid. Other than their ability to place a vote, something which, by many accounts, a number were unable to do, the people of Haiti were not involved.